Japan's Loss in WWII

Would lacquer have launched its amazement attack on Pearl Harbour if its leaders had cognise this act of aggression would result in the inconceivable forlornness of nuclear war?

According to military historian Cristopher Bassford this confound of the best laid plans of military strategists is "what Cla rolewitz called 'friction,' stemming from war's uncertainty, chance, suffering, confusion, exhaustion, and fear. Friction stems from the effects of time, space, and benignant nature; it is the fundamental and unavoidable force that makes war in reality differ from the abstract model of 'absolute war'" (Bassford 1).

In collection to understand what led the Japanese to expand from their islands out into the contact countries of Asia and engage in the fateful attack on the united States that eventually brought about their own downfall, it is necessary to consider what their history, interests, and intentions were.

"Japan entered World War II with limited aims and with the intention of scrap a limited war" (Matloff 499). It's goals were similar to, and perhaps modelled on the colonial conquests of the European nations which originated from the voyages of disc everywherey in the 15th speed of light and continued well into the 20th century. It wanted to secure the resources that it painfully lacked on its island chain by militarily dominating its Asian neighbors.

In the late 19th century Japan was squeeze to open its

assault and had no choice but to react to American bullying by retaliating militarily. But this is refuted by the fact that Japan had a farseeing record of discord with the U.S. -- at least since the Tripartite obligation it made with the other Axis powers of Nazi Germany and Mussolini's fascist Italy formalizing their opposer to this country. Furthermore, after several decades of aggressive military interventions in Asia, it would be standard operating procedure for an expanding colonial power to use military force to defend its interests against its main competitor and antagonist, who, it should be remembered, had been making similarly forceful conquests of other lands -- from Mexico to Cuba to the Philippines, paralleling the rise of Japanese expansion.

But true to Sun Tzu's dictum that it is better to lure without battle than to confront the enemy directly, the ally command conceived of a style of advance across the Pacific that often outflanked and jumped over well dug in Japanese defenses, thus version them useless. In the Battle of the Philippine Sea, the Japanese were deceived as to U.S. oceanic probes, rushed into battle unprepared, forgot their own battle plans, and were overwhelmed. If totally they had brought along a copy of the Art of War. Their navy's losses could no semipermanent be replaced in time to maintain their level of force, because Allied bombing runs were now systematically destroying Japan's homeland industrial infrasctructure, as well as harassing their supply and reinforcement lines. While they gloss over had several million soldiers and numerous planes available to defend mainland Japan, when the equal nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki broke their will to resist further, they could have only lasted a few more months according to the most bullish analyses.

In attacking the United States the Japanese leadership in like manner underestimated the American capacity to fight a war on two fronts, as it appeared inevitable that the U.S. was already about t
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